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Abstract
The thesis that judges could (voluntarily or not) promote efficiency through their 
decisions has largely been discussed since Posner put it forward in the early 1970s. 
There nonetheless remains a methodological aspect that has never (to our knowledge) 
been analyzed and that we address in this paper. We thus show that both promoters and 
critics of the judge-and-efficiency thesis similarly use a definition of optimization in 
which history, constraints and path-dependency are viewed as obstacles that must be 
removed to reach the most efficient outcome. This is misleading. Efficiency cannot be 
defined in absolute terms, as a “global ideal” that would mean being free from any 
constraint, including historically deposited ones. That judges are obliged to refer to the 
past does not mean that they are unable to make the most efficient decision because 
constraints are part of the optimization process; or optimization is necessarily path-
dependent. Thus, the output of legal systems cannot be efficient or inefficient per se. 
This is what we argue in this paper.
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11. Introduction
As attested recently by the debate around “legal origins” (e.g., Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002; Roe, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), judge-made law 
systems are viewed as the most economically efficient ways of organizing justice and 
the provision of legal rules. It was actually one of the first, and most controversial, 
claims made by Richard Posner when he launched his “Economic Analysis of Law” in 
the early 1970s2. Besides this systemic aspect, Posner also had a complementary 
argument about judicial decision making and the behavior of judges. He argued that the 
Common Law3  is efficient because judges (at least implicitly) adopt an economic 
reasoning that leads and allows them to make decisions that promote an efficient 
allocation of resources4.
2 Posner wrote: “[t]he common law method is to allocate responsibilities between 
people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, 
or, what amounts to the same thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities” (1972 b, 
p. 98). 
3 We do not focus on legal orders in general, but more specifically on common law 
systems (essentially because discussions are about those systems). This does not 
necessarily mean that our reasoning could not apply to other types of legal systems 
(implicitly, because our approach is methodological and relates to the role of 
constraints in a process of optimization, it could). However, whether the statement 
would also be valid for civil law or Muslim legal systems remains an open question 
and a question that is far beyond the limits of this paper.
4 Posner (1972 a) grounded his demonstration in the analysis of the decision made by 
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. that was, according to 
Posner, based on a comparison of costs and benefits. Basically, one of the arguments 
made by Posner about efficiency and judicial decision making was that efficiency 
was a value, a norm that guides judges in their work. He wrote, for instance, that “[i]n 
searching for a reasonably objective and impartial standard, as the traditions of the 
bench require him to do, the judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was 
the product of wasteful, uneconomical resource use. In a culture of scarcity, this is an 
urgent, an inescapable question. And at least an approximation to the answer is in 
most cases reasonably accessible to intuition and common sense” (1972 b, p. 99).
2But what is efficiency? This is a very controversial subject on its own and it 
would be impossible to discuss all the definitions that are "available". Stated briefly, in 
this paper, we follow Posner’s definition: a judgement, an action, or a law enhances 
efficiency if it enhances wealth — rather than utility. Thus, we associate efficiency to 
wealth maximization where wealth corresponds to “the value in dollars or dollar 
equivalents [. . .] of everything in society” and is measured by “what people are willing 
to pay for something, or if they already own it, what they demand in money to give it 
up” (Posner, 1979, p. 119). In effect, Posner uses the Hicks-Kaldor —rather than the 
Pareto — criterion to characterise an optimal allocation of resources: Wealth is 
maximized if those who are made better off by a change can compensate those who are 
made worse off. By contrast, those who work on the economic efficiency of legal 
systems did not explicitly give a definition of their conception of efficiency.
Very rapidly too, it can be noted that what we propose to name the judges-and-
efficiency thesis attracted the attention of scholars who, alternatively, tried to prove it 
right or to prove it wrong, but the debate did not settle with a definite conclusion. About 
40 years later, scholars seem to be clearly split between two camps. One is a total 
rejection of the judges-and-efficiency thesis— i.e., there is no such thing as an efficient 
legal system and optimization through legal decisions is impossible. The other is a 
partial endorsement of the thesis— i.e., the legal system is inefficient but is improving, 
tending to efficiency but not reaching it. Thus, if the situation is currently better than it 
used to be, the debate does not seem to have reached a precise and definition conclusion 
to the question of the contribution of judges to the efficiency of a legal system. And, to 
be clear, it is not our purpose to settle this ambitious question in the paper. We do not 
3either wish to defend nor to criticize the judges-and-efficiency thesis. Our objective is 
rather to  propose a methodological contribution to the debate by focusing on and 
discussing the nature of “efficiency” in these works. We thus want to show that those 
who criticize it and also, very surprisingly, those who defend it use a very misguided 
view of optimality. Our purpose is therefore to argue that debate about optimization and 
the law cannot proceed forward unless participants of the debate become clear on the 
nature and meaning of rationality and, in general, optimization. For terminological 
clarity, this paper uses the phrase “rationality” as one type of optimization; other types 
include natural selection.
Our claim is the following. The defenders and critics of the judges-and-efficiency 
thesis share the same assumption. If inefficient rules exist, they must be a proof that the 
optimization approach is, at first approximation, futile for the study of the legal system. 
The assumption, put differently, regards the existence or survival of inefficient rules as 
the hammer that nails the coffin of the optimization approach. We shall show that such 
an assumption retains a misguided view of optimization—where optimization entails 
supposedly the production of a “global ideal,” i.e., an ideal set of legal institution that 
would be suitable in the abstract sense, i.e., abstracted from consideration of the 
particular constraints. To wit, the quest after the global ideal entails that one would, at 
first approximation, accord the optimization approach attention only if decisions of 
judges entail no constraints—i.e., as if the judges can be optimizing only if not restricted 
or restrained by historical particular circumstances. And the fact that optimization is 
logically impossible without constraints, and the fact that hardly any society enjoys a 
fairy-tale land of constraint-free economies, such a global ideal—i.e., constraint-free 
4decisions—is a non-starter as a criticism of the rational choice approach to law. 
Put differently, we argue that no optimization problem can escape constraints—where 
constraints by definition is “scarce resources” that is deposited historically, i.e., from the 
past. Such constraints include the environment, in terms of the quantity of resources and 
the relative prices of such resources, as well as the ability of the productive agent as 
measured by human capital, health, physical capital, and social capital (such as trust or 
resilience of the social network).
We make what appears to be a strong thesis: No society can escape constraints, 
and its regret about existing constraints is either an expression of naivety or an 
expression of a revolutionary zeal to change institutions in order to set up in their place 
an imagined, more efficient constraints. So, even after a revolution, and after the 
introduction of a set of innovative laws, one still has to deal with constraints. Therefore, 
any social situation is necessarily an economic one: decisions have to deal with 
constraints. There is a little room for romanticism—no matter how revolutionary or how 
innovative one’s program of institutional change is.
Thus, even when we pay attention to creativity, revolutionary zeal, and innovation 
[Khalil, 2007], the creative agent must still optimize. To assert otherwise, one would be 
a victim of the “global ideal” myth, as explained below. Even the innovative agent must 
embrace the given constraints. As  much as the  innovative agent changes some 
constraints, the agent has to deal with deeper constraints, on one hand, and deal with the 
revolutionary ones that the agent is instituting, on the other. Constraints, again, cannot 
be ignored—they express the means to action that are by definition the product of 
precious actions (the past) and consist of time constraints, resources, and ability. There 
5would be no meaning to rationality or optimization without constraints or scarcity. In 
fact, to characterize a rule as “inefficient,” one must be appealing to particular 
constraints under which the legal rule is outdated or dysfunctional. This implies that 
optimization, by definition, cannot be called pure or impure—if “pure” means that it is 
constraint-free.   At   the   theoretical   level,   it   is   impossible   to   have   constraint-free 
optimization. This would be in a scarcity-free world—and if such a world exists, there 
would be no need for legal rules—not to mention a need decision making per se.
Our argument has its roots in a critique of the spandrelist theory, a theory advanced 
by  Stephen  Jay  Gould  and  Richard  Lewontin,  which we  discuss  in  section  2. 
Spandrelists use the example of the Panda's “thumb” as a proof that evolution cannot 
produce an optimal hand, where the thumb is situated efficiently in the palm, as it is the 
case of the primate thumb.  Sections 3 and 4  clarify our point: optimization is 
necessarily riddled with historically deposited constraints, i.e., evolution of institutions 
and the legal framework must be path-dependent. Sections 5 and 6 show how these two 
forms of optimization apply in the evolution of law or, more precisely, how they are used 
by law and economics scholars either to justify or to criticize the efficiency of the 
evolution of law. We thus show that, either in a framework in which optimization is 
modeled as a consequence of rational choice or as a result of natural selection, path 
dependence and historical constraints are endemic of the process.
2. The Panda's thumb: A Critique of Efficiency
Many of the papers that criticize the possible efficiency of legal systems defend their 
claims by arguing that legal systems are subject to excessive historical inertia—where 
6the term “inertia” is used interchangeably with “path dependence” and “lock-in” 
institutions. The apotheosis of historical inertia in economics is the purportedly 
inefficient QWERTY keyboard, while the apotheosis of historical inertia in evolutionary 
biology is the supposedly inefficient Panda's “thumb”.
The parallel between economics and biology is not artificial. Indeed, the two 
examples (the QWERTY keyboard and the Panda’s “thumb) are frequently used in the 
same papers to prove the importance of history as a constraint on the evolution of legal 
systems and the irrelevance of the idea that these systems could be economically 
efficient. For instance, Hattaway (2001, p. 164) states that legal rules are the “(l)egal 
equivalents of the imperfect panda’s thumb or the inefficient Qwerty keyboard—
evidence of the rule’s path of development”. For his part, Roe (1996, p. 658) quotes the 
same example to sustain his claim that “(b)iological evolution is ... imperfect, based on 
preexisting structures that adapt to survive, not to be perfect”. A reference can also be 
made to Elliott (1986, p. 306) who states that “evolution is not infinitely malleable” and 
that “(e)volutionary processes work by modifying existing structures”. And such ideas 
are used to argue that Common Law is also riddled by historical structures that make the 
law greatly inelastic, which is taken to mean “inefficient,” with respect to changing 
conditions or, what economists call ‘incentives’. However, and this is where we depart 
from the standard argument on the (in)efficiency of Common Law and judge-made law: 
the panda's thumb is no more an instance of the inefficiency of the evolution of 
biological tools than the QWERTY keyboard, even if entrenched, is an example of the 
inefficiency the evolution of technological tools. While evolution may be burdened by 
historical structures and, hence, “not malleable”, it nonetheless remains efficient.
7To focus on the giant panda, as detailed elsewhere (Khalil, 2011a), let us stress that it 
has a unique biological tool that is essential for its daily production activity. While the 
tool functions as a “thumb”—anatomically it is not. It is an enlarged wrist bone, called 
“radial sesamoid,” that is situated on the other side of where the “proper” thumb is 
located. The out-grown wrist bone is supported with a muscle that has been re-arranged 
so that the animal can manipulate the out-grown wrist bone as a “thumb”. This 
manipulation allows the animal to grasp bamboo shoots and strip off the bark. Actually, 
bears and raccoons, the panda’s closest relatives, have also out-grown wrist bone, but 
not to the extent found in the panda. Figure 1 illustrates the contrast between the out-
grown wrist bone in the giant panda and a grizzly bear.
Figure 1: The Panda’s Sixth “Digit”
(source: http://godlessliberal.xanga.com/704297531/unintelligent-design/)
The Panda’s “thumb” actually functions as a sixth “digit”, and it is an awkward one. 
It seems that it has been “added” to the basic plan of the forelimb, which specifies only 
8five digits, as an “after-thought”, Now, according to Gould (1978), if evolution were 
efficient, the innovation (or what biologists call “mutation”) should have been “thought 
out” thoroughly. To be more precise, given that the panda needs a thumb, an “efficient” 
innovation should have encouraged the specialization of one of the already existing 
digits as a thumb as it is the case with humans. Thus, the conclusion that Gould, and 
others too, draws from the instance of the panda’s “thumb” is that evolution is not 
efficient. To wit, Gould has documented throughout his other essays how nature is rarely 
“efficient”. He shows how nature selects tools (traits) that are usually clumsy, i.e., fall 
short of what he considers to be a divine (i.e., “efficient”) plan. For Gould, only the 
divine plan is optimal (efficient). Gould argues that Charles Darwin himself was not 
only aware of but also accepted the supposed inefficiency of nature when Darwin (1984) 
studied the fertilization of orchids by insects. In effect, Darwin notes how fertilization 
takes place by improvising new functions to historical structures, existing pedals, which 
were never intended to be used for fertilization.
Gould (1987) extends his analysis to argue that also human tools evolve in a non-
optimal manner. For Gould, humans, similar to nature, do not choose according to 
optimal (i.e., divine) plans: both simply work with the products of history, i.e., existing 
structures, by re-arranging existing parts to produce a tool that is functional but also that 
is almost invariably clumsy. More boradly, Gould considers that living entities in 
general evolve in a clumsy manner: they manipulate and rearrange the old parts of 
existing structures, and re-employ them in new functions, rather than start afresh with 
more “efficient” (i.e., ideally suited) structures. Nature fail to act like God: it does not 
take its time and re-design from scratch new structures that are better suited for the new 
9functions. For instance, once mammals took flight, i.e., as best illustrated by the bats, 
nature did not take its time to re-design for the forelimbs properly. So bats are not ideal 
flyers as the case with birds.
Thus, the role of history in evolution by natural selection is meant by Gould as a 
critique of adaptationism. Although adaptationism is a broad and sometimes vague 
perspective (see for instance, Ghiselin, 1966), it can be defined, at first approximation, 
as the view that natural selection is the most important factor in evolution—whereas 
natural selection entails that evolution is largely an optimal process. Gould's critique of 
adaptationism came to be commonly known as “spandrelism” after Gould and Lewontin 
(1979; see also Gould, 2022) had explained how the spandrels of San Marco cathedral in 
Venice are well-entrenched. In their joint work, Gould and Lewontin assert the relevance 
of history in evolution by natural selection by arguing that structures are not eradicated 
once they are proven to be non-useful; they are rather re-fitted and re-configured 
awkwardly for new functions. And therefore, historical structures limit the innovations 
that one or evolutionary selection can introduce. But, maybe more importantly, Gould 
and Lewontin derived from the importance history plays in evolution that innovations 
could never be “efficient”—they are rather limited by historically inherited pathways or 
constraints. They critique the adaptationist program for which “the near omnipotence of 
natural selection in forging organic design and fashioning the  best of all possible 
worlds” (Gould and Lewontin, 1979, p. 584; emphasis added)5.
The critique of Gould and Lewontin’s of adaptationism can become complicated in 
5 Beatty and Desjardins (2009, p. 232) note that Gould and Lewontin use the 
expression ‘‘the best of all possible worlds’’ 5 times in their article.
10two other ways (see Beatty and Desjardins, 2009). First, the order of the succeeding 
environments in the past determines which structure is selected and, hence, which 
structure becomes more fundamental historically. Second, the order of random mutation 
in the past has equal importance in explaining what structure was selected in the past. 
But these two questions of order merely introduce the issue of contingency and chance, 
which is never denied by the natural selection argument. Actually, the natural selection 
argument depends on taking the environment as contingently given and taking the 
genetic material as arising stochastically. Therefore, by pointing out that environments 
and genetic material are contingent does not undermine the adaptationist (natural 
selection) argument: namely, current features are selected to fit the given environment, 
irrespective of how contingent is the past. Thus, the spandrelist critique only amounts to 
pointing out that there are spandrels, i.e., features that actually have no fitness value, i.e., 
they are simply the by-products of inherited structures.
As   shown   below,   the   spandrelist   view   of   evolution   actually   expresses   a 
misunderstanding of the nature of optimization in evolutionary biology. With respect to 
the “thumb” of the panda, Gould cannot assert that it is “inefficient”—simply judging it 
from the point of view of God or a global ideal. By definition, no global ideal can 
actually exist—and one may add, even in the mind of God. To hold the feasibility of 
some global ideal amounts to ignoring the role of costs and constraints in evolution—a 
situation where one cannot even provide a bare explanation of traits, tools, and 
institutions such as the legal system.
113. Optimization à la Natural Selection
Is the panda’s “thumb” a good illustration of the limits of optimization? Does the 
persistence of structures, body plan, path dependence, or historical inertia means that 
newly evolved practices, rules, and behavior are necessarily inefficient? These questions 
have stirred great debates in evolutionary biology (Schwartz, 2002). These questions 
have crucial implications for economics. In particular, human institutions, and more 
specifically, legal framework and rules are greatly constrained by structures handed 
down by history. Does this mean that institutions and legal rules are inefficient—i.e., 
were capable to escape the optimization criterion? If so, as a corollary, the intervention 
of a central planner is necessary to ensure efficiency.
To answer the question, we have to submit the spandrelist agenda to a closer scrutiny. 
This requires a study of the nature of optimization in evolutionary biology. As mapped 
above, the debate concerning optimization in evolutionary biology is carried out by two 
opposing camps: adaptationism, which is spearheaded by Richard Dawkins (1989, 
1999),   John   Maynard   Smith,   among   many   others—and   spandrelism,   which   is 
represented by, for instance, Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin. As to the former 
camp, Dawkins (1999, pp. 38-41), e.g., concedes that organisms cannot escape history. 
He then, correctly notes that the evolution of clumsy re-arrangements of historically 
deposited  structures  should  not  undermine  the  idea   that  evolution  proceeds  via 
optimization. He argues that evolution is not about the production of some ideal plan.
A closer examination of the nature of optimization shows that the notion of “global 
ideal” is untenable on logical grounds—i.e., the issue is not a question of practicality, 
costs of adjustment, or historical inertia arising from transaction costs. The common 
12critique of the rational choice approach to law, on the ground that it does not attain the 
global ideal, hence, collapses because the global ideal is non-feasible even if “God” has 
to set up the institutions.
To demonstrate the point, following Khalil (2011a), let us examine how nature 
chooses a trait from the set t (t={t1 ... tj ... tm). The trait can be seen as a biological tool. 
Each tool requires a corresponding behavior (b={b1...bj...bm}). The trait or tool, and the 
corresponding behavior, must be chosen in light of the given resource constraints, the 
set of inputs x. The goal is to produce an end (E). Nature also has to take as given a 
transformational function, which is usually represented as a mathematical function, 
which can transform each trait, behavior, and inputs, into a particular end. The 
transformational function can be called “scheme” (s). The scheme can be seen as a 
“deeper” or a “higher-grade” trait. But it is not a member of the set t. It is rather the 
function that transforms each element of the set t to the set of ends (E={Ei}):
            sk
{x1b1t1 ... xibjtj
*... xnbmtm  C │ j}                           E1 ... E*
i ... En
where sk is a particular scheme among possible many schemes (k=1, ..., o). The scheme 
can be seen as the historical constraint or structure that typifies the species or higher 
taxon. As such, it differs from the set of environmental constraints (C) that are external 
to the structure. While the scheme typifies the set of organisms, C is the set of resources 
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nssuch as nutrients, predators, climate, and so on.
The scheme is a neutral transformer. It is up to nature to decide which is best tool and 
associated behavior (xibjtj
*) to produce the optimal end (E*
i). This decision is taken in 
light of the determination of what is the optimal end (E*). So, while the scheme, the 
upper arrow, acts as a functional operator for all the elements of the input set, natural 
selection (ns), the lower arrow, specifies a particular element and ranks it as better than 
other elements, and hence acts as a relator operator.
The main focus here is to distinguish between the scheme (sk) and the set of traits (t). 
While there is only one scheme, the set of traits has many traits. The scheme itself is not 
subject to selection by nature. It only transforms values from inputs to outputs, and lets 
nature undertake the selection. But for nature to undertake the selection, there must be a 
scheme that cannot be simultaneously the subject of selection. This highlights that 
optimization, by definition, must assume a scheme that cannot itself be questioned or 
selected when natural selection takes place. Even if God, rather than nature, were 
performing the optimization, He would not be able to question the scheme—i.e., God 
has to accept what history has deposited. In contrast to what is usually argued, such 
acceptance cannot be regarded as a dark spot in the operation of optimization. Rather, it 
is the nature of optimization: if God or nature does not take the scheme as given, there 
can be no selection to start with.
This should not mean that the scheme can never be chosen or be the subject of 
selection. To the contrary, the scheme can be selected--but only when the scheme 
becomes a member of the set of schemes that are part of the inputs set—and there must 
be a deeper or a higher-grade scheme that is outside the selection. The deeper scheme, 
14again, transforms the input values, including the different lower-grade schemes, into 
output values. So, selection can operate at different levels or time spans, what Eshel and 
Feldman (2001) call “short-term evolution,” which is governed by a fixed set of 
genotypes, and “long-term evolution,” where the genotypes can themselves be subject 
to selection. In long-term evolution, there must be a deeper grade or design that is taken 
for granted and cannot be selected. As such, even God has to take the deeper scheme as 
given. That is, God, similar to nature, cannot escape the upper arrow, the given structure 
or body plan, and hence has to improvise the re-arrangement of parts in a clumsy 
manner. So, the notion of some global ideal, taken as if there is no limiting or 
constraining scheme acting as functional operator, is untenable.
4. Optimization à la Rational Choice
Optimization via rational choice is, at first approximation, no different from an 
optimization process through natural selection.6 Such similarity between the two kinds 
of optimization can be demonstrated as follows. Let the agent, rather than nature, choose 
a particular technological tool from the set t (t={t1 ... tj ... tm}). Each tool, as in the case 
of biological tools, requires a particular behavior (b={b1 ... bj ... bm}) with respect to the 
nutrients or ingredients (x). Likewise, the agent has to make the decision in light of the 
set of constraints such as climate and market institutions. Each tool, along with the 
accompanying   behavior,   are   used   in   conjunction   with   x   to   produce,   via   a 
transformational function, an end (E). Again, the scheme is a unique functional operator 
that translates the varied variables into the set of ends (E={Ei}):
6 Obviously, there are differences, such as the level of change for instance, which need 
concern us at second approximation only (Khalil, 2009).
15                 sk
{x1b1t1 ... xibjtj
*... xnbmtm  C │ j} E1 ... E*
i ... En
The scheme here again is a higher-grade technology and is not subject to choice, 
while the variety of lower-grade set of technologies (t) are the subject of choice. The 
scheme is unique functional operator that defines each output with respect to input. It 
differs from the relational operator, in this case rational choice, which acts as a 
relational operator. The relational operator ranks, according to a criterion, the inputs and 
identifies the best input (xib`tj*) in light of the best output (E*i). The relational operator, 
the lower arrow, cannot choose the scheme under such set-up. The scheme, the upper 
arrow, is outside the choice set. Again, the technological scheme is what has been 
deposited by history, such as the QWERTY keyboard, and cannot be questioned as 
engineers improvise and improve the typewriter.
This should not mean that engineers do not question the scheme. But this requires 
another set-up, where the scheme is part of the tool set and is transformed by a deeper 
technology. As such, the engineers can introduce a totally different scheme if justified 
by the constraints and given the deeper technology. In the case of typewriters, the most 
appealing and seemingly more efficient  alternative to QWERTY is the Dvorak 
Simplified Keyboard (DSK). According to Paul David (1985), users initially favored the 
QWERTY keyboard over others such as DSK because the mechanical arms tend to jam 
less with the QWERTY keyboard than the alternatives. However, the arm-jamming 
16
rproblem was minimized in later developments of the typewriter and, in fact, totally 
eliminated with the innovation of the ball-point typewriter. Still users continued to favor 
QWERTY over the more obviously efficient DSK. David argues that the reason cannot 
be   efficiency.  The   persistence   of   inefficient   structures   is   the   outcome   of   path 
dependence. Path dependence entails that the old technology or legal framework ensues 
increasing returns arising from learning-by-doing, which would block the introduction 
of a more efficient technology or legal framework.
Actually, path dependence turns out to be a more tricky phenomenon to discuss than 
it could be supposed at first sight. As can be shown by the analyses proposed by Stan 
Liebowitz   and   Stephen   Margolis   of   the   QWERTY   keyboard.   First,   they   have 
demonstrated that  QWERTY is actually a bad example of inefficiency: i the keyboard 
has simply never beinferior to DSK. Second, even if one uses QWERTY as a stylized 
example of the persistence of structures, technologies, and legal frameworks that resist 
replacement for no reason other than historical inertia, even in that case, Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1994, 1995) continue to argue, QWERTY cannot be used as an example of 
efficiency or market failure. They provide a useful three-way distinction between three 
degrees of path dependence:
1. The first-degree of path dependence is the benign choice of standards that have 
no   welfare   advantage.   For   instance,   a   country   can   choose   one   kind   of 
measurement standards or a language that would not make it less or more 
efficient if it has chosen another set of standards. We ignore this type of path 
dependence.
2. The second-degree of path dependence is the choice of technologies or legal 
17frameworks that afford economies of scale. This entails that there would be 
switch cost that would not be justified by the expected benefit of adoption of 
new and apparently more “efficient” technologies or legal frameworks.
3. The third-degree of path dependence is the continuous choice of technologies 
and legal frameworks  despite  the fact that the switch cost is lower than the 
expected   benefits   of   adopting   the   more   efficient   technologies   and   legal 
frameworks.
Concerning the second-degree, Liebowitz and Margolis correctly maintain that, if 
QWERTY is not replaced because of economies of scale, it means that the switch cost is 
too huge to justify the switch. And such entrenchment is not indicative of market failure, 
not to mention inefficiencies in general. Even a central planner should not switch to the 
apparently better technology because the cost of switching, which includes the long-
years of re-learning and adjusting, is not worth the benefit. 
The above discussion of the difference between the scheme and the set of traits 
illustrates the second-degree path dependence. It might have been better to have adopted 
some other scheme in the past. But when one makes a rational choice, one cannot wish 
for the past to be different. One has to take the existing structure as given. But even 
whent the existing structure is compared to others, as when one subjects a variety of 
schemes to choice, the old scheme may continue to be the favourite given the enormous 
switch cost in light of the expected benefit.
This argument highlights that choice can never be about some global ideal. Any 
choice has to reckon with constraints, which are ultimately the products of the historical 
past. Such constraints include all the economies of scale garnered as a result of choice in 
18the past. So, the phenomenon of path dependence, at least at the second-degree, does 
not entail inefficiency.
Concerning the third-degree, it clearly entails inefficiency. But Liebowitz and 
Margolis, and many others such as Deirdre McCloskey (quoted in Lewin, 2002, ch. 11, 
pp. 16-17 ), doubt that it exists. When challenged to produce evidence of the existence of 
the third-degree of path dependence, David (2001b) avoided the particularly tricky 
question of empirical investigation. Instead, David (2001a) advanced the argument that 
humans might not choose according to the rationality criterion to start with. For him, 
humans are rather prisoners of their own habits, what is known as “habituation”, That is, 
humans do not choose their own routines. They rather become habituated to the routines 
with which they possess.
This line of argument, which follows the approach of Herbert Simon, opens a whole 
discussion about the nature of action and routine with which agents start. This is not the 
place to discuss the merit of Simon’s line of argument (Khalil, 2012). It suffices to raise 
two questions: If people are “stuck” with the routines with which they start, is the origin 
of the primordial or initial routines? That is, why would agents start with one set of 
routines rather than another set? Further, if agents are prisoners of routines, how come 
they search for alternatives and actually shed away their de facto routines?
5. Judicial decision making and the efficiency of common law
In the preceding sections, we have shown that optimization à la rational choice or à la 
natural selection can proceed only if there are constraints. If there were no constraints, 
i.e. no scarcity, individuals (either human beings, animals, plants, or firms and 
19organizations) would not have to make choices, to start with, about the best possible 
allocation of (non-scarce) resources among alternative ends. In other words, in the 
absence of constraints, there would be no scarcity and therefore there would be no need 
to economize resources and no need for optimal choices: any choice would be as good 
as its alternative.
In this section, we apply this reasoning to the issue of the efficiency of judicial 
decision making that was proposed by Posner in the early 1970s. The critics of Posner 
usually point out that judges make inefficient decisions because of the presence of 
constraints—implicitly meaning that efficiency cannot but arise in the absence of 
constraints.
To be clear, none of the promoters of judges-and-efficiency thesis — Posner (1972), 
Priest   (1977)   or   Landes   and   Posner   (1979)   —   addressed   directly  the   issue   of 
optimization (which necessarily involves constraints) and path dependence. This is not 
surprising since the concept of path dependence was absent from the literature when 
Posner and others wrote their first works on efficiency and judicial decision making. It 
is not before the mid-1980s in effect that the issue of path dependence was identified as 
discussed   above  with   regard   to   David’s   QWERTY   example.   Certainly,  .   David 
eventually conceded to the argument made earlier, writing that “the concept (as 
understood here) itself carries no necessary implications whatsoever in regard to the 
existence or nonexistence of ‘market failure’” and does not imply “that a decentralized 
competitive market process can result in a socially inefficient outcome” (Ibid., p. 103)7. 
7 To David, the main difference between “path dependence” and “market failure” is 
that the former concept is “dynamic” and the second “static”. Thus, it is “a total non 
sequitur to assert that the essence of path dependence – a property defined for 
20However, what still dominates the literature is the fact that the path dependence idea 
heavily connotes inefficiency or “potential market failure” (Heine and Kerber, 2002, p. 
48).8 In any case, the path dependence idea has proved to be helpful to understand the 
evolution of law especially with regard to the spontaneous rise of legal orders. Thus, 
anticipating David's 2007 claim that  dependence should be regarded as “foundational” 
and essential for any social science, including the question of efficiency of legal 
systems, Hattaway (2001, p. 164) argued that the “path dependence theory to the law 
thus provides new insights into the course and pattern of legal change in a common law 
system ... offering a corrective to the evolution-to-efficiency claims that have dominated 
this scholarship in recent decades.”
As discussed above, we need a precise idea what is efficiency and how can one 
characterize path dependence as inefficient. The historical inertia of past decisions does 
not engender necessarily wrong or suboptimal decisions—as shown in the case of 
second-degree path dependence. Legal practices of the past may remain prevalent and 
dominant even if the situation of the society has changed—and this should not 
necessarily mean inefficiency. Even if we define path dependence as the phenomenon 
when “rules are unable to change with the underlying social conditions that they 
analyses of dynamical and stochastic processes – consists in asserting propositions 
regarding the possibility of ‘market failure’ that were proved first in the context of 
purely static and deterministic models” (David, 2001 b, p. 23). He added that “[q]uite 
the contrary proposition holds: under full convexity conditions a non-tâtonnement 
general equilibrium process can be shown to converge in a strictly path dependent 
manner on one among the continuum of valid ‘core’ solutions which satisfy the 
criterion of Pareto optimality” (2001 b, p. 23).
8 Few   economists,   mostly   working   in   the   Hayekian   tradition,   argue   that   path 
dependence plays a positive role in the evolution of the common law (e.g., Mulligan, 
2002; Colombatto, 2003).
21govern” (Hattaway, 2001, p. 164)—such rules are not necessarily inefficient. 
It is rather characteristic of all legal systems to be conservative — or static in the 
terms used by Epstein (1980), i.e., to resist adaption or evolution in response to new 
conditions. Others have also stressed that legal rules are generally “unable to adapt to 
changes in the underlying conditions they seek to organize or accommodate. When an 
institution fails to adjust, we can say ... that it has become ‘lock-in’” (Gillette, 1998, p. 
813). In other words, path dependence is not problematic per se and is in fact desired to 
create stability and, in particular, to allow agents to form stable expectations. To wit, 
legal rules are usually embedded in legal paradigms that are intentionally designed to 
resist adaptation and change. Heine and Kerber (2002), for instance, provide an analysis 
of the path dependence of legal rules in terms of technological paradigms, i.e., inherited 
technological frameworks. Both legal and technological paradigms exhibit stability. As 
paradigms, legal systems transform inputs, situations and problems into legal solutions 
or legal decisions in a more-or-less predictable manner. Therefore, there exists a tension 
between this need for stability, on the one hand, and the need to change rules to face new 
challenges or new situations. From our perspective, it cannot be said that such tension is 
problematic. The problem arises when it is interpreted in terms of inefficiency. This is 
what Heine and Kerber (2002) do when they note that these paradigms determine legal 
trajectories that result in “considerable” or “severe” path dependence effects . The idea 
is that, once installed on one path, on one trajectory, the legal system cannot move up, 
switch to a more supposedly efficient one or, definitely, to some global ideal system: 
“the legal rules applied may not always be the very best, or most efficient, that could be 
constructed were courts unconstrained by history” (Hattaway, 2001, p. 164; emphasis 
22added).
As the preceding quotations suggest, efficiency and inefficiency are wrongly defined 
in absolute terms: a rule is efficient if it is the “very best”; one speaks of “most 
efficient” rules rather than simply efficient rules. And, accordingly, any departure from 
some supposed global ideal is interpreted as a proof of inefficiency. Such an absolute 
perspective is contrary to the definition of efficiency as shown above. It, in effect, 
defines efficiency as the consequence of the capacity to get rid of the constraints of 
history—which is impossible. In fact, the references to the past and to history are 
usually taken as a source of inefficiency. What is seen by revolutionaries as ‘inefficient 
rules’ sustained by inertia, can be interpreted as rules that have not exhausted their 
potential, i.e., they still have sufficient benefits to confer . This is the case when rules 
should not be judged along a “global ideal’ but relative to the constraints, and some 
constraints may validate existing rules that seem to be inefficient.  That is, not all rules 
that are the product of inertia can be lumped as inefficient.
The particularly Manichean reasoning — which envisages only two forms of legal 
systems, one in which rules can be efficient because history plays no role and another 
one in which judges make inefficient decisions because they are constrained by history 
— rests on a very misconstrued view of the role of history in legal decision making. The 
past normatively supposedly imposes its weight on judges and inevitably and univocally 
determines their decisions. To put it differently, judges are viewed as blindly and 
mechanically applying past decisions. In effect, as stressed by Hattaway, what matters to 
judges is “the order in which cases are presented to the courts” (2001, p. 164)—which is 
equivalent to the biological critique of natural selection based on the fact that mutations 
23are ordered by history. Therefore, “legal outcomes are shaped not only by the facts and 
issues presented in the courtroom but also by the history of the courts’ consideration of 
similar cases” (Hattaway, 2001, p. 164).
This perspective supposes that judges are involved in third-degree path dependence—
a path dependence such that superior rules exist and could have been chosen to replace 
outdated ones, and where the transition costs to the superior rules are lower than the 
extra benefit of the new rules, but agents do not choose the new rules simply because of 
the force of habituation or routines. As Kronman notes, it is not only that “(t)he past 
constrains us and limits our present possibilities, and ... that we must take these limits 
into account if we are to act rationally now, that is, with full awareness of the costs and 
benefits of our actions” (1990, p. 1036) but rather that “we are bound by the past in the 
sense of being obligated to respect it for its own sake” (1990, p. 1036), that is 
independently from the costs it imposes on us. No surprise if it can be read that path 
dependence   is   “a   kind   of   irrationality   closely   connected   with   inconsistency” 
(Kornhauser and Sager, 1986, p. 107), by which it is meant that the reference to the past, 
which is blind and therefore irrational, leads to inefficient decisions.
Certainly, at secondary and tertiary approximations, mistakes are possible and, as 
Schauer notes it, because of the reference to the past and because of path dependence, 
“there is the omnipresent possibility that any mistake will be systematically more 
powerful than any later attempts to correct it” (2006, p. 909). It is possible for an actual 
legal practice to be out of step with new constraints because of errors. Also, it is usually 
the case that past limits current decisions because of the switching cost as illustrated by 
the cases of second-degree path dependence. But does it mean that legal practices, at 
24first approximation, are prisoners of the past in the sense of the third-degree path 
dependence?
Our claim is that we should avoid discussing the problem of the efficiency of legal 
decision making without first adequately delineating the issue, viz., whether the 
historical inertia is the outcome of second- or third-degree path dependence. In effect, 
the genuine questions that have to be raised are the following: is optimization 
conceivable only in a model in which history plays no role? Is it possible to get rid of 
the past and to assume that references to the past are generally the sources of 
irrationality and inefficiency? Alternatively, is it possible to reconcile optimization and 
path dependence, rationality and adherence to the precedent? Our argument consists in 
providing a negative answer to the first of these two questions and a positive answer to 
the second one. Just like spandrelists who confuse historical inertia with inefficiency, 
the critiques of the thesis that judges could promote efficiency forget that historical 
constraints cannot be avoided and, in fact, must be embraced by the all-perfect social 
planner. The past constraints provide, at first approximation, the cultural tools needed to 
tackle problems and, as Schauer notes, “(r)eliance on precedent is part of life in general” 
(1987, p. 572). Even if one admits that their behavior is routinized, the existence of 
routines does not imply irrationality and does not necessarily lead to inefficiency.
Thus, we follow Posner (2000, p. 588) when he writes that we rely “on the past either 
because we lack good information about how to cope with the present and future or 
because legal innovation involves heavy transition costs.” Actually, the two reasons 
amount to one reason: as long as the costs of legal innovation are high, the legal system 
of the past should generate useful outcomes. The persistence of the past may not appear 
25as choice, but rather as being powerless in changing rules when we “cannot exercise 
choice in any meaningful sense at all” (Hirshleifer, 1977, p. 10). But such appearance 
should not deceive us into thinking that judges, when they accept historical constraints, 
they are behaving irrationally. They do not use past decisions mechanically but willingly 
in light of the prohibitive cost of legal innovations.
That judges are not prisoners of the past in the third-degree sense of path dependence 
can be evidenced, first, by the fact that precedents are not binding only because there are 
past rules. Judges may be obliged to follow precedent decisions because they are part of 
the hierarchy of rules9. Second, it may also be that there are no precedents to which 
judges could refer and therefore they are, to use Posner's words, in an “open area” and 
therefore necessarily depart from the past. 
So, adherence to the past can be rational. To wit, there exists a vast literature that 
analyses path dependence and adherence to the precedent as the result of a rational 
behavior (see in particular Harnay and Marciano, 2003). This literature shows that legal 
precedent helps us to economize on the costs of decision-making similar to how 
heuristics, in light of the cost of cognition, economize on calculations. In addition, legal 
precedent improves communication between courts, thereby allowing for judicial 
specialization,   the   minimizing   of   errors,   and   allowing   for   correction   of   errors 
(Kornhauser, 1989; Macey, 1989). Judges may choose to utilize past rules and accept to 
substitute the opinions of their colleagues to their own because they believe that the 
9 To make our point more explicit, and hopefully clearer, the "hierarchy of rules", that 
is the ordering of rules in a legal system that tells individuals which rule has to be 
used in which circumstances, which actually corresponds to the structure of the legal 
system is arguably a consequence of the evolution of the system. It is also a product 
of the past and is part of the set of constraints that affect judicial decision making.
26other judges are, or were, better informed than they are (Barnejee, 1992; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992, 1998; Daughety & Reiganum, 1999, for an application to 
judicial decision-making). Judges may decide to follow precedent decisions because 
they rationally believe that these decisions were better than the one they can issue. So 
ironically, sticking to precedent can be indicative of rational decision making rather than 
of irrationality.
More broadly, it can be said that the routinized behavior of judges and their 
encapsulated forms, i.e. the precedent, are the products of rational choice. Routinized 
behavior are no different from biological tools, such as the panda’s “thumb” or the claws 
of bats. Even when such tools are clumsy, as the case with the panda’s “thumb,” they are 
more efficient than trying to institute new radical tools that may not be justified by their 
cost. This finding should not be different if one supposes that natural selection is the 
motor behind the evolution of legal systems, to which we turn next.
6. Inefficient judges and efficient judge-made-law
The alternative to the maximalist interpretation of the judges-and-efficiency thesis, in 
which optimization results from rational behavior, consists in explaining the efficiency 
of the Common law as the result of an optimization process that operates through 
natural selection. Thus, certain legal  systems  are globally efficient because their 
functioning rests on an underlying evolutionary process that operates at the level of rules 
and selects the most efficient of them. This was pointed out, in its modern form, in the 
mid and late 1970s.10
10 Actually, the theory that legal rules evolve through a process similar to natural 
selection was older and the first attempts to propose evolutionary explanation of the 
27These 1970s were the times when economists and biologists found a reciprocal 
interest in their respective disciplines and believed that they could mutually help each 
other to gain insights in the phenomena they seek to explain. Quite interestingly for our 
analysis, it appears that one of the first area in which social scientists used biology was 
that of the emergence and evolution of legal rules; or, to be more precise, it was in the 
emerging field of “law and economics”. Jack Hirshleifer, one of the most prominent 
supporter of bioeconomics, published his first papers on economics and biology in law 
and economics journals (Hirshleifer, 1977, 1982). Then, very rapidly, the idea that 
evolutionary models could be used to explain the efficiency of Common law attracted 
the attention of some economists (Rubin, 1977, 1980; Priest, 1977, 1980; Goodman, 
1978; Terrebonne, 1981). These models developed, under various forms, a claim known 
as the selective litigation thesis. From the perspective of our paper, although important, 
Paul Rubin's articles may be less relevant than others since they argue that the evolution 
of legal rules essentially depends on the behavior of litigants. By contrast, the most 
interesting works are those written by George Priest precisely because they include a 
reference to judges and judicial decision making. Thus, wrote Priest, 
“[e]fficient rules "survive" in an evolutionary sense because they are less 
likely to be relitigated and thus less likely to be changed, regardless of the 
method of decision. Inefficient rules "perish" because they are more likely 
to be reviewed and review implies the chance of change whatever the 
method of judicial decision. If judges were to occasionally err then the 
tendency toward efficiency could not be reversed. If judges were able only to 
choose rules achieving partial inefficiency, even if they could do so 
infallibly, the set of legal rules still would tend over time to contain more 
efficient rules than judges desired, because rules that imposed greater 
inefficiency   would   be   more   likely   to   be   relitigated.   It   is   evident, 
furthermore, that the tendency of the common law over time to favor 
efficient rules does not depend on the ability of judges to distinguish 
law date back to the late 19th century (see, for instance, Hovenkamp 1990, p. 1016).
28efficient from inefficient outcomes. Even where judges are ignorant of the 
allocative effects of their judgments, they will be led by the litigation 
decisions of individual parties to promulgate rules that increase the relative 
proportion of efficient rules” (Priest, 1977, p. 72).
Or, as another participant to the discussion, John Goodman, concludes: “even if judges 
decide cases randomly, the body of legal precedents will tend, over time, to have an 
efficiency bias” (1978, p. 394). In effect, “the more inefficient a legal rule, the greater 
the social cost it imposes and, thus, the greater the probability that it will be challenged 
through litigation since the benefits of litigation versus out-of-court settlement will also 
be greater. Conversely, once inefficient rules are overturned and replaced by efficient 
precedents, the new precedents will be less likely targets for ensuing litigation” 
(Goodman, 1978, p. 394). In other words, natural selection was precisely regarded as a 
means to explain efficiency despite judicial decision making.  This interpretation does 
mean that judges are absent from the process but rather that inefficient individual 
decisions can nonetheless lead to systemic efficiency. This is what Cooter and 
Kornhauser (1980, p. 140) maintain when they note that “the law may improve over time 
... even if judges lack any insight into the efficiency of laws and even if litigants only 
follow their self-interest.” This is what we propose to call the minimalist interpretation 
of the judges-and-efficiency thesis according to which judges may promote efficiency 
even if they do not behave efficiently.
For our purpose, there is no need to go into more details about the reasoning that 
allowed these economists to conclude that a natural selection process is at work in a 
Common Law legal system. We rather want to discuss how the outcome of the process 
is described and, in particular, analyse how efficiency and inefficiency connect and 
29complement each other. From this perspective, it is striking to note the cautiousness of 
the conclusions reached by the different authors. Thus, all of those who worked on this 
issue insist that there is only a “tendency” or a “bias” towards efficiency. For instance, 
Priest notes that one important aspect of his 1977 paper is that it “has not shown that the 
rules of the common law are or ever will be completely efficient. It has suggested only 
that the common law process incorporates a strong tendency toward efficient outcomes” 
(1977,   p.   81;   emphasis   added).   Similarly,   Cooter   and   Kornhauser   describe   as 
“pessimistic” (1980, p. 140) the  conclusion they reach and that states that the 
evolutionary forces of natural selection “can improve the law relative to what it would be 
in their absence ...[but]... cannot achieve a maximum on some standard of goodness 
(such as economic efficiency)” (1980, p. 140; emphasis added). About thirty years later, 
these are the same conclusions that Gennaiopoli and Shleifer (2007) put forward: “the 
conditions for ultimate efficiency of judge-made law are implausibly stringent” (p. 61) 
but nonetheless there exists “a tendency for the law to become more efficient over time” 
(Gennaiopoli and Shleifer, 2007, p. 61; emphasis added).
Therefore, these models conclude that the optimization forces of natural selection do 
not guarantee the efficiency of the entire system (see also Priest's statement, 1980, p. 
400)11. Just as in the models based on rational choices, optimization  à la  natural 
11 It could also be said (as it was by one of the referees) that there is a "collective 
action" problem that prevents individual actions to have global consequences. In 
effect,   what   fundamentally   mattersin   decisions   to   go   to   court   and   challenge 
supposedly inefficient rules are the individual net gains (or costs) rather than the 
overall efficiency of a legal rule. Individuals do not care whether or not a rule is 
globally efficient to challenge it. However, this issue (collective action) is outside our 
focus because, anyhow, this problem is surmounted first, by class action suits, and 
second by “social movements,” political parties, lobbies, and even revolutions. 
Collective action issues present only extra transaction cost—which is admittedly in 
this particular case “inefficient.”
30selection appears to be incomplete or imperfect. The process promotes only partial 
efficiency because, eventually, it will stop; that is, it will stop before total and absolute 
efficiency is reached and before all inefficient rules have been replaced by efficient 
rules: the evolution and natural selection “process will settle down to a stable state in 
which each legal rule prevails a fixed portion of the time. Both "efficient" and 
"inefficient" or "best" and "worst" rules recur perpetually” (Cooter and Kornhauser, 
1980, p. 140) or as Hirsh (2005, p. 429) puts it “then we would expect common law 
rules to move toward efficiency, and then to cease moving at some point short of 
efficiency”, Inefficient rules survive the natural selection process and do not always 
perish, which means that the system cannot be efficient. This involves circularity of 
reasoning: the tendency towards efficiency and improvement is explained by the 
survival of inefficient rules that, conversely are regarded as a proof of the inefficiency 
of the system.
In addition, and this represents a more important problem, the efficiency-through-
natural-selection literature commits the same kind of Manichean fallacy as the one we 
have identified in the preceding sections. Namely, optimization, via rational choice or 
via natural selection, has to be perfectly efficient in the sense of the global ideal—i.e., 
as if constraints should be deleted or history erased. Evolution, like rational choice, must 
lead to a global ideal or perfect state in which there is no room for inefficient rules. The 
survival of old legal systems, despite the availability of apparently better ones, is 
necessarily indicative of the failure of natural selection to generate efficiency. We have, 
once again, an opposition between some global ideal or inefficiency12.
12 Priest seemed to be aware of the problem. He noted that the standard literature on the 
efficiency of legal systems — in which he did not include the literature on natural 
31Quite interestingly, the impossibility of reaching a perfectly state of efficiency, that is 
the impossibility that optimization through natural selection be perfect, is also explained 
by the weight of the past. An argument that can be found in the writing about the 
evolution of the law is that the tendency towards efficiency can indeed be undermined 
by the weight of the past—a thesis that does not differ from the one that is used by the 
opponents of the efficiency-of-the-common-law thesis and that we have presented 
above. Thus, Rubin (1977, p. 61) stresses the anti-efficiency role that precedent plays: 
“when neither party is interested in precedent, there is no incentive to litigate, and 
hence, no pressure on the law to change”, As a consequence, “the current rule will 
persist, whether it is efficient or inefficient” (Rubin, 1977, p. 56). Similarly, Priest's 
model includes path dependence, since the evolution towards efficiency depends on the 
proportion of efficient (relative to inefficient) rules in use in a society at the preceding 
period: “[i]n this simple model the proportion of efficient rules in force at any period is 
a function of the stock of efficient and inefficient rules in force at the previous period, 
the respective rates of relitigation of efficient and inefficient rules, and the proportion of 
efficient rules announced by judges (the judicial bias toward efficiency)” (1977, p. 69). 
Thus, if one interprets Priest's claim in terms of path dependence, it means that the 
evolution towards efficiency depends on the legal trajectory on which the system is. An 
important stock of inefficient rules will set the system on a “low” (that is, inefficient) 
trajectory, a trajectory that will be difficult to evade. Similarly, Goodman notes that “it 
may be impossible to reverse the precedents of the past when changing economic 
selection — rests on a “binary” (1980, p. 410) approach of efficiency in which rules 
are “regarded ... simplistically as either perfectly efficient or inefficient” (1980, p. 
415).
32conditions warrant such a reversal. Precedent tends to weigh heavily upon decisions of 
the court ... If the bias imparted by precedent is too great, however, a change in 
precedent may be impossible” (1980, p. 405). For their part, Cooter and Kornhauser 
argue that the use of a Markov process allows them to reduce the weight of the past: 
“[w]e believe this assumption introduces a bias towards the conclusion that the common 
law through blind evolution tends to efficiency” (1980, p. 142). By contrast, “Under a 
precedential system, one in which more-established rules are more likely to persist or 
ones in which "well-reasoned" opinions more strongly bolster rules than badly-reasoned 
ones, an inefficient rule might become entrenched and hence more likely to persist. 
Efficient rules, of course, might also become entrenched but in a system of "blind" 
justice there is no reason to believe that efficient rules will be more likely to be 
entrenched at the "outset" than inefficient ones” (ibid.).
The core of this reasoning, again, is based on the false opposition of efficiency with 
path dependence. Even if legal rules evolve via natural selection, rather than via rational 
decision, it does not mean that efficiency is tainted by historical inertia of deep 
biological structures. As depicted in the figures above, natural selection, or rational 
decision, necessarily mean that there is a scheme, the binary operator, which cannot be 
the subject of optimization. Therefore, the persistence of precedents is not a blemish but 
rather the hallmark of optimization.
To some extent, Priest (1980) comes close to such conclusion, that it remains possible 
to reason in terms of optimization even if the process does not affect certain constraints. 
In the course of his demonstration, he analyses how the decision made in Hardley v. 
Baxendale (1854), that was assumed to be efficient by Posner, was used in subsequent 
33litigation. Precisely analyzing this point, Priest shows that the rule established in 
Hardley was applied sometimes very differently in various cases and that “it is very 
difficult to conclude that each application is efficient” (Priest, 1980, p. 414). In other 
words, the initial decision made in Hardley v. Baxendale can be regarded as a legal 
frame that defines a set of future possible decisions. It therefore, and at the same time, 
constrains judicial decision making and also leaves judges sufficient room of maneuver 
to make efficient, and sometimes inefficient, decisions.
7. Conclusion
The judges-and-efficiency thesis can receive two interpretations: first, it can be argued 
that judges promote efficiency because their decisions are rational and efficient or, 
second, the legal system can be efficient even if judges take inefficient decisions. Either 
method of optimization cannot really be threatened if individual decisions turned out to 
be infected with error. Of more importance, either method of optimization cannot be 
threatened by showing historical inertia or the persistence of historically deposited legal 
systems. To the contrary, historical inertia is implied, by conceptual and mathematical 
necessity, in the process of optimization. In fact, optimization is not needed, or cannot 
even proceed, if there is no historical inertia as expressed in the underpinning scheme 
that acts as a binary operator, the transformational function that transforms inputs into 
multitude of possible outcomes. So, this paper departs from the critics of the judges-
and-efficiency thesis insofar as these critics highlight historical inertia as evidence of 
the irrelevance of optimization.
Thus, our claim is a critique of the use of the path dependence phenomenon in the 
34attempt to demonstrate that legal systems cannot be efficient. But, the proposed critique 
does not amount to be a defense of the status quo or accepting whatever institutions 
produced by history. Our analysis differs from Friedrich Hayek's argument about the 
positive and stabilizing role of history, customs and the tradition in the process of 
evolution of rules. To Hayek and his followers, the past is important because it avoids 
rapid changes and permits changes only after time has checked and tested what could be 
useful. Similarly, although close by certain aspects, our argument differs from the one 
put forward by Richard Epstein on the static nature of the law (1980)—according to 
which, it is not the purpose of legal rules to change as the social, societal context 
changes. Our argument is of a different nature. We do not defend or attack the 
institutions of the past, as expressed in legal traditions and customs, as if following the 
institutions of the past have positive effects, or vice versa. Rather, we claim that it is 
impossible to use, in a per se fashion, path dependence and the reference to the past as a 
critique against the efficiency of a legal system.
On the other hand, this paper departs from the advocates of the judges-and-efficiency 
thesis. These advocates seem to apologize for the fact of historical inertia, agreeing 
implicitly that historical inertia is, in principle, a blemish on the march of optimization. 
The advocates have reached a consensus: optimization, whatever the form through 
which it operates, is globally impossible. Efficiency is only a tendency, that is visible 
through partial improvements, but cannot be used to describe a state that will be 
eventually reached. The consensus is best expressed in the position of Parisi who notes 
that “[o]ur history, in this sense, constrains our present choices. We may wish we had 
developed more efficient customs and institutions, but it would be foolish now to 
35attempt to change them” (Parisi, 2003, p. 257). From this perspective, rather than 
criticizing precedents as obstacles on the path towards efficiency, a more promising — 
in the sense that it is closer to our own argument — consists in showing that other legal 
environments  and various  doctrines of precedent will lead to different efficient 
allocation of resources (see Fon, Parisi and Depoorter, 2005 or Parisi and Luppi, 2009).
Such a consensus presumes that the global ideal is theoretically possible, but cannot 
be practically possible because of history—as if history is an extra detail that could be 
ignored at first theoretical approximation. To put it differently, the consensus presents 
history as a barrier that prevents, at the practical level, the possibility to reach some 
supposed optimal state regarded as the global ideal, a perfect state of efficiency. As this 
paper has argued, history or structures or legal systems deposited from the past are, at 
first approximation, needed and necessary. Optimization can never, even theoretically, 
attain the global ideal for the simple reason that optimization can only take place if there 
are historically deposited constraints. The argument that matters could be perfect if there 
were no historical inertia actually undermines the very raison d'être for optimization.
Our thesis might nonetheless appear weak on one point and can be criticized for, 
being tautological. In effect, it could viewed as meaning or implying that whatever 
exists must be optimal because it is efficient—in other words, the critic would be that 
we endorse the position of Dr. Pangloss that Voltaire ridicules in Candide. 
However, at a deeper look, our thesis does not suffer from Panglossianism. We would 
be guilty of  Panglossianism  if and only if whatever exists was supposed to be the 
product of first- and second-degree path dependence—i.e., if and only if we would have 
excluded third-degree path dependence. But this is actually not the case: our thesis can 
36accommodate the possibility of third-degree path dependence because (or when) we 
recognize that legal systems does not operate and thus do not evolve in a political 
vacuum. As a consequence, legal systems are also the result or the product of the 
exercise of the  power of some political or judicial elites. The latter are certainly able of 
influencing — in that case, one might even say "manipulating legal rules and 
accordingly of increasing artificially the cost of switching from one rule to another one 
to the detriment of the well-being of the population. Such manipulation allows the 
judicial and political elites to benefit from rents; or, in other words, expected rents are a 
good reason for elites to manipulate legal rules in order to prevent the evolution of the 
legal system towards more efficient rules. Conversely, this means that political and legal 
elites would increase artificially the cost of switching if switching weakens its grip over 
power or diminishes its rents. To provide a full account of such a possibility requires the 
introduction of the tools of public choice, or even the politics of collective action and 
the analysis of formation of political movements, which obviously falls outside the 
parameters of this paper.
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